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Sponsored Media
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and Alistair Willis2
Abstract
The Russian state-funded international broadcaster RT (formerly Russia Today) has 
attracted much attention as a purveyor of Russian propaganda. To date, most studies 
of RT have focused on its broadcast, website, and social media content, with little 
research on its audiences. Through a data-driven application of network science 
and other computational methods, we address this gap to provide insight into the 
demographics and interests of RT’s Twitter followers, as well as how they engage 
with RT. Building upon recent studies of Russian state-sponsored media, we report 
three main results. First, we find that most of RT’s Twitter followers only very rarely 
engage with its content and tend to be exposed to RT’s content alongside other 
mainstream news channels. This indicates that RT is not a central part of their online 
news media environment. Second, using probabilistic computational methods, we 
show that followers of RT are slightly more likely to be older and male than average 
Twitter users, and they are far more likely to be bots. Third, we identify thirty-
five distinct audience segments, which vary in terms of their nationality, languages, 
and interests. This audience segmentation reveals the considerable heterogeneity of 
RT’s Twitter followers. Accordingly, we conclude that generalizations about RT’s 
audience based on analyses of RT’s media content, or on vocal minorities among its 
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wider audiences, are unhelpful and limit our understanding of RT and its appeal to 
international audiences.
Keywords
RT (Russia Today), Twitter, Russian propaganda, audience research, computational 
analysis
Introduction
The Russian state-funded international broadcaster RT (formerly Russia Today) pur-
portedly aims to provide a Russian perspective on events and issues to international 
audiences. In doing so, RT blurs the lines between news reporting, propaganda, and soft 
power (Wright et al. 2020: 2), and has, since its creation in 2005, become the subject of 
much controversy—especially in the “Western” states in which it operates and seeks to 
exert influence. The controversies vary in different parts of the world. In America, the 
intelligence services stated that, throughout the 2016 presidential elections, RT was 
central to Russian “influence efforts to denigrate Secretary Clinton” (Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence 2017). As a result, RT has had to register there as a 
foreign agent and has also been banned from using paid advertisements on some social 
media platforms. In France, RT has been accused of promoting protests by the “Yellow 
Vests,” leading President Macron to draft legislation to ban media that are considered 
to “de-stabilise the country” (Newman et al. 2019: 84). In the United Kingdom, RT was 
fined £200,000 by the communication regulator Ofcom for impartiality breaches in 
their reporting on the Skripal poisoning and Syrian conflict (Elliot 2019).
Most previous academic work has focused on the content that RT produces and its 
role in the international media environment. Studies have found that RT courts con-
spiracy theories (Yablokov 2015), propagates mis/disinformation (Cull et al. 2017; 
Ramsay and Robertshaw 2019), disseminates anti-Semitism (Rosenberg 2015), pro-
motes Islamophobia (Lytvynenko and Silverman 2019), and has produced and ampli-
fied media content that supported the election of Donald Trump (Jamieson 2018). Far 
less attention has been paid to RT’s online audiences, such as the users who consume 
and are exposed to its content (cf. Crilley and Chatterje-Doody 2020a; Crilley et al. 
2019; Fisher 2020a). More broadly, Szostek (2018: 117) notes that studies of Russian 
state-funded international news media are only “rarely informed by substantive 
research into the behaviour and thought processes of news consumers” themselves. 
Indeed, few analyses have empirically investigated how RT’s audiences engage with 
and interpret their content.
Our study examines the validity of many existing assumptions about RT’s audi-
ence through a data-driven analysis of a large Twitter dataset. The paper proceeds in 
five parts. First, we review the literature on RT and characterize it as commuting 
across three main operational paradigms: propaganda, alternative media, and soft 
power. Second, after noting the limited number and scope of audience research 
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studies on RT, as well as a tendency to assume that audiences and RT mirror each 
other, we raise some key questions about RT’s audiences and Twitter followers. 
Third, we present our data on RT’s main international Twitter account @RT_com. 
Fourth, we proceed to a discussion of the results and suggestions for future research 
before. Fifth, we draw conclusions.
Our study makes two interlinked arguments that contribute toward a better under-
standing of RT’s audiences. We find that, first, RT Twitter followers rarely engage with 
RT content, and therefore claims that RT has a large audience that supports its “anti-
Western” worldview are misguided (Cohen 2014). RT’s Twitter followers may be 
exposed to its content, but rarely do they appear to endorse it. Second, through com-
putational network analysis, we find that RT’s Twitter followers do not appear to be “a 
niche audience of activists” (Orrtung and Nelson 2019: 14). Rather, the majority of 
RT’s Twitter followers follow RT alongside many other major sources of international 
news. RT’s Twitter audiences are fragmented mainly along lines of national, linguistic, 
and cultural interests rather than by political identities or ideologically extreme views.
RT’s Operational Paradigms: Reviewing the Literature
Despite the political attention it has received, research on RT is patchy, including aca-
demic studies (Hutchings et al. 2015; Miazhevich 2018), think-tank reports (Bodine-
Baron et al. 2018; Richter 2017), and journalistic pieces (Dowling 2017). Most 
research has focused on the role and objectives of RT, with some suggesting that it is 
a key component of Putin’s propaganda machine (Cull et al. 2017). Others argue that 
it is a public diplomacy resource, only mobilized to augment Russian soft power when 
needed (Rawnsley 2015). RT is also understood to operate as an “alternative” media 
channel which lacks the legitimacy of legacy broadcasters such as the BBC World 
Service, Deutsche Welle, and France Médias Monde (Rawnsley 2015). RT is generally 
held in widespread disrepute and mainly criticized as a nefarious tool of the Russian 
state. Yet, as Galeotti (2018) convincingly argues, there is “no single organizing prin-
ciple, let alone controlling agency” that manipulates RT as an organization or dictates 
the agenda for the journalists who work for it. Just because RT positions itself at times 
as an alternative to, and an opponent of, “mainstream media,” this does not mean that 
it operates exclusively as “Putin’s puppet” or a simplistic propaganda agent for 
Russia’s neo-authoritarian regime (Chatterje-Doody and Tolz 2020; Dajani et al. 2019; 
Galeotti 2018; Tolz et al. 2020).
In much of the literature, RT is judged to be overtly anti-American, aiming to 
undermine the U.S.-led global order (Elswah and Howard 2020) in an attempt to “jus-
tify Russian government policies and create an image of Russia as the leader of global 
resistance to the US” (Yablokov 2015: 312). RT, it is argued, thrives through its con-
stant attacks against the hypocrisy of the “West,” and support for Putin’s leadership 
(Miazhevich 2018: 6), while projecting an image of Russia as “a rapidly advancing 
nation threatening (though not succeeding) to disturb the hegemonic balance of power” 
(Hutchings et al. 2015: 641). Similarly, Kragh and Åsberg (2017) find that RT portrays 
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Russia as a major global power which enjoys the support and cooperation of other 
international actors.
As an international news provider, RT’s greatest success has been on social media, 
particularly YouTube, where RT was the first news channel to reach over a billion 
views. RT’s most successful YouTube videos rarely touch on political or ideological 
matters. Rather, their focus has been on sensational, eye-witness reports of catastro-
phes and disasters, for example, user-generated footage of the 2011 Japanese Tsunami 
(Chatterje-Doody and Crilley 2019b; Mickiewicz 2018). In fact, according to figures 
quoted by Mickiewicz, political videos count for only 1 percent of RT’s YouTube con-
tent. Perhaps exposure to RT is limited not only in size but also in content—a key 
focus of our empirical investigations.
Following RT on Twitter
Increasingly, there is recognition that attention needs to be shifted away from RT as a 
broadcaster to its online audiences. In particular, Mickiewicz (2018) urges scholars to 
undertake more robust and detailed audience research—which is much needed given 
the lack of robust evidence informing current debates. Audience research is particu-
larly important for developing a better understanding of RT and its distinctive opera-
tional paradigms. However, investigating RT’s audiences is a difficult task. Hutchings 
et al. (2015: 653) argue that “we still know precious little about the way in which 
international audiences interact with news organisations like RT” and Yablokov simi-
larly contends that it is “hard to define [RT’s] audience/s and the efficiency of its mes-
sage” (Hutchings et al. 2015: 310).
Notably, RT’s audiences are frequently viewed with the same disdain directed at RT 
itself and are (at least implicitly) considered to be ideologically closely aligned with 
RT’s political framing on issues and events (Birrell 2018). For example, according to 
the journalist Nick Cohen (2014), RT has a “huge western audience that wants to 
believe that human rights are a sham and democracy a fix.” Equally, Turner (2016) 
suggests that RT has “a large and disillusioned western audience.” Yet the assertion 
that RT has a “huge” or “large” audience is not borne out by empirical research. 
Mickiewicz (2018: 1–13) draws on data from the Neilson reports to suggest that the 
size of RT’s TV audiences is small to negligible in America, while research from 
IPSOS suggests that RT’s television audiences are also extremely small in Western 
European countries and are not growing except in the Middle East, and in Syria and 
Iraq particularly (Ipsos Connect 2018). Online, RT has a larger following than on TV, 
but it is still relatively small compared with other state-backed broadcasters (Al-Rawi 
2017). Part of the challenge for researchers of international broadcasting, propaganda, 
and soft power is that estimating RT’s true audience is difficult. For instance, Yablokov 
(2015: 311) argues that “it is virtually impossible to measure the channel’s success and 
influence.”
Understanding the size of RT’s audience is only one part of the puzzle—of equal 
importance is understanding who those audiences are. A small number of previous 
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studies have attempted to address this problem. Miazhevich (2018: 3) suggests that if 
one is to go by its narrative frames, RT aims “to appeal to audiences who have an anti-
establishment, anti-corporation and anti-western (particularly anti-American) predis-
position,” an argument also expressed by others (Elliot 2019; Newman et al. 2019; 
Ramsay and Robertshaw 2019: 24). Orttung and Nelson’s (2019: 1) analysis of 
YouTube videos published by RT supports this view and suggests that RT has a “tri-
partite strategy,” underscoring its distinctive operational paradigms: “primarily target-
ing an audience outside the West; working to complement local media in target 
countries; and pushing narratives to promote a positive image of Russia.” They also 
argue that “RT seems to have found a niche audience of activists. Unsurprisingly, its 
viewers, like for most international news channels, tend to skew toward highly edu-
cated males” (Orrtung and Nelson 2019: 14). A study of YouTube comments made in 
response to RT videos about the Syrian conflict found that the sample of audiences 
analyzed tended to support the broadcaster’s characterization of the conflict and 
expressed support for Russia alongside anger and mistrust of the “West” (Chatterje-
Doody and Crilley 2019a: 174). Richter (2017: 13) characterizes RT’s audience as 
comprised of people who support conspiracy theories because they are “distrustful” of 
“mainstream media.” Similarly, Birrell (2018) suggests that RT’s online audiences are 
vulnerable to the “malign force” of its media content, and are situated on the fringes of 
mainstream politics, attracted to niche interests and incendiary ideas, as well as anti-
American and anti-“Western” discourse.
Part of the problem here is that relatively little work has focused directly on RT’s 
audiences and, instead, has attempted to infer the interests, outlooks, and traits of 
RT’s audience based on the content that it broadcasts. This is a fundamentally flawed 
approach as there is no intrinsic reason why the perspectives of RT’s audiences 
would necessarily mirror those of the broadcaster itself. As Mickiewicz (2018: 3) 
notes, “content is one big piece of the puzzle, but one cannot argue from content 
alone back to the audiences’ intake.” Furthermore, we caution that the results of 
many previous studies are based on the behavior of only a very vocal minority (i.e., 
those who actually engage with RT’s content), and therefore their attitudes and 
beliefs are unlikely to be representative of their entire audience. There is, therefore, 
a pressing need to understand RT’s audiences more holistically, especially to under-
stand whether they are truly as extreme and niche as is often suggested. In particular, 
it is unclear from previous work whether the large audiences that RT’s content can 
potentially reach have any genuine interest in supporting RT’s “anti-Western” per-
spective. Here, data-driven approaches which can analyze large numbers of follow-
ers, as opposed to smaller scale qualitative research, can help to understand the 
nuances of RT’s broader audience. Subsequently, in this study, we investigate the 
extent to which the average RT Twitter follower engages with RT’s content. 
Alongside this, we use computational network science to ascertain the shared demo-
graphic features and interests of RT’s Twitter followers to understand whether they 
are as politically extreme as others have claimed.
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Researching RT’s Audience on Twitter
The need to better understand RT’s audiences raises the more conceptual question of 
what an audience is. The changing aspects of how, when, where, and by whom inter-
national news is consumed are re-shaping audience configurations, and subsequently, 
social science research on audiences is undergoing change too (Gillespie and Webb 
2012; Rogers 2013). We can no longer assume that audiences consume news in con-
ventional ways or places. News is now often consumed on a smartphone, and attention 
paid to any one news item can be short and superficial. Indeed, audiences often receive 
news from multiple platforms and sources in a “hybrid media system” where the cul-
tural power to produce, interpret, and respond to news shifts more fluidly between 
users, producers, and political actors (Chadwick 2017).
Online technologies have radically altered social networks and modes of engage-
ment, leading to a proliferation of weak ties and informal modes of interaction. On 
Twitter, following an account is financially cost-free and logistically easy. It can also 
be done without reciprocation, which means that it is not dependent upon anyone else 
(as with two-way ties on platforms such as Facebook). Twitter followers are not equiv-
alent to a traditional broadcast audience, nor even to the engaged “active” audiences 
who comment on YouTube videos (Chatterje-Doody and Crilley 2019a; Crilley and 
Chatterje-Doody 2020a, 2020b). Indeed, a user might follow an account but never 
engage with it—and simply forget to unfollow it. Just because someone may follow an 
account (and are therefore likely to be exposed to its content), they might not endorse 
it (Marwick 2018).
Yet following an account is a useful indication of interest because, although it does 
not entail a financial cost, users have to choose which accounts they follow, and, in the 
so-called “attention economy,” following an account involves “spending” attention 
(Harsin 2015). As each user’s timeline is algorithmically populated, partly based on 
which accounts they follow, following an account means a user (that is not a bot or an 
inactive account) is likely to be exposed to that account’s content which could, in turn, 
not only resonate with prior worldviews but also inform and sustain their beliefs, pref-
erences, and outlook by appealing to deep stories (Marwick 2018). Such processes of 
algorithmic content surfacing have been criticized for creating and reinforcing biases 
and injustice online, and for potentially encouraging users to engage in harmful behav-
iors (Caplan et al. 2018). We also note that which accounts users follow has been suc-
cessfully used in studies to infer ideological positions, indicating that followership 
contains important political and social signals (Barberá 2015). Furthermore, research-
ing RT’s Twitter followers provides insight into the “big and broad” audiences who are 
likely to be exposed to its content, extending research beyond the narrow group of 
highly vocal and highly engaged, but also most likely atypical, users who comment on 
or reply to its content. This is particularly important given that many online users are 
“lurkers” who passively consume content, rarely if ever engaging with it (Sun et al. 
2015).
Overall, insufficient attention has been paid in previous work to who is exposed to, 
and consumes, RT’s content. Current accounts are either very narrow, lack nuance and 
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detail, or are not routed in empirical evidence. To test assumptions about audiences 
outlined in the literature above, and to better understand RT’s audiences, we conduct 
empirical analyses to answer three key questions:
•• Research Question 1: To what extent does the average Twitter follower of RT 
engage with its content?
•• Research Question 2: What are the key demographic features of RT’s Twitter 
followers?
•• Research Question 3: What are their main interests of RT’s Twitter 
followers?
Data
We study Twitter, due to its major significance as a news sharing platform. Twitter 
allows information about its users to be accessed through their Application 
Programming Interface (API). However, restrictions are also imposed on the amount 
of data and the frequency by which it can be collected.1 Our analysis is therefore based 
on a sample of the 2.6 million users who follow RT’s main international Twitter 
account (@RT_com). We selected a random sample of users, as well as information 
about the other accounts they follow. Our data collection proceeded in several steps. 
First, we collected a list of every user which follows RT (n = 2.6 million). Second, we 
randomly selected a sample of users from this list of 2.6 million. Third, for each user 
in our sample, we collected all of the accounts which they follow.
Power tests indicate that for a two-sided effect in a one-sample t-test, 10,000 users 
would be capable of detecting effects as small as 0.042, with alpha of .01 and power 
of 0.95. We use this as a heuristic for sampling users from Twitter, given that this 
would allow for even very small effects to be detected. We initially sampled 12,151 
followers of RT; 1,490 accounts (12.3 percent) were set to private/protected (and so 
data were not available) and 270 accounts (2.22 percent) had been deleted during the 
period of data collection. The rate of 12.3 percent is toward the higher end of estimates 
of private accounts on Twitter; Liang et al. found that the rate of private accounts var-
ied by country, with a range of between 1.4 and 16.9 percent and an overall mean of 
5.4 percent (Liang et al. 2017). In total, 85.5 percent of the accounts we collected were 
available for analysis, leading to a sample of 10,391 users (above our target size of 
10,000).
For the 10,391 users in our sample, we collected their profile information and the 
accounts that they follow, creating a followership network with 6.48 million connec-
tions in total. Each user in our sample follows, on average, 624 other accounts. We also 
collected all of their tweets on November 25, 2019. In line with Twitter’s API con-
straints, we collected the last 3,200 tweets for each user. However, while for most 
users this provides full historical coverage, for a small number of highly active users 
it only covers a small window of time. To account for this, we limited the earliest date 
of the tweets to November 25, 2018, thereby giving a one-year period of data 
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coverage. Less than 5 percent of the users in the dataset hit the 3,200 tweet limit, 
which indicates our data collection has strong overall coverage. The dataset comprises 
1.87 million tweets.
In addition to this, we collected a further random sample of 1,000 Twitter users to 
serve as a control group, which enables us to understand how our sample of RT follow-
ers differs from other users more generally, with a high level of statistical power. The 
random sample was identified by collecting 100,000 tweets from the Twitter stream, 
searching for users who used the term “News,” on November 1, 2019. We then ran-
domly sampled 1,000 unique users from these tweets. We use a “general” sample of 
users so as to understand RT’s followers in the broader context of Twitter, rather than 
biasing interpretation of the results by focusing on a purposive sample, such as follow-
ers of another news provider. We collected metadata for 934 of these users (93.4 per-
cent) as the remainder had protected their accounts. None of the users in this random 
sample engage with or follow RT.
Method
Social network analysis has been widely used to understand social media users. For 
Twitter, the audience is typically represented as a graph, or network, with nodes repre-
senting user accounts, and directed links representing follower relationships. To iden-
tify different segments of users within our 10,391 sample, we use the concept of 
modularity. In the case of a Twitter network, a modular collection of nodes in the 
network is a set of users which have more links between each other than links with 
other users (i.e., they have more links within the set than leading out of it). In practice, 
this means that they tend to follow many accounts, which are the same. A widely used 
algorithm for identifying modular groups is the Louvain algorithm (Blondel et al. 
2008). We applied the Louvain algorithm to the sampled Twitter network using the 
python-louvain2 library to identify distinct segments of users.
To characterize each of the user segments identified by the Louvain algorithm, we 
then applied a surfacing methodology, which let us identify the “most characteristic” 
accounts followed by each segment. These are accounts which are followed by an 
unexpectedly large number of users from each segment. The intuition behind this 
approach is that it is not particularly surprising that in every segment a large number 
of users follow Barack Obama because he is one of the most followed accounts on 
Twitter. However, the fact that in some segments many users follow some fairly 
obscure Twitter accounts is much more informative. This methodology lets us surface 
these unexpectedly well-followed accounts for each segment, providing a way of dif-
ferentiating between them in a very granular way. The methodology is based on previ-
ous work in network science to characterize online communities, as well as insights 
about the long-tailed distribution of social media followership in general (Cha et al. 
2010), and it is a novel application of established statistical procedures in this context 
(Fog 2007).
There are five steps to our method. First, the 10,391 users in our sample follow 3.03 
million unique accounts in total. For each of these 3.03 million unique accounts, we 
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calculate the expected number of followers from our sample using Wallenius’s non-
central hypergeometric distribution. This takes into account (1) the number of follow-
ers the account has across all of Twitter, (2) how many accounts each user in the 
sample actually follows (i.e., how many “follows” they have to allocate), (3) the size 
of the cohort (n = 10,391), and (4) the average number of followers for all accounts 
on Twitter, which we estimate is 707, based on figures provided by the company 
Brandwatch.3 Wallenius’s distribution is a variation of the hypergeometric distribution 
(a discrete probability distribution which is similar to the binomial distribution), which 
describes sampling of items without replacement (Fog 2007). Here, the “items” are 
followers. Wallenius’s explicitly accounts for the fact that a randomly selected user is 
statistically more likely to follow an account with many followers on Twitter than an 
account with very few followers. Second, the expected number of followers for each 
of the 3.03 million unique accounts is divided by their actual number of followers to 
calculate a cohort-level “relative followership” metric. This gives us a better under-
standing of the popularity of accounts within our cohort given their popularity on 
Twitter overall. At this stage, all calculations are for the cohort, and the segmentation 
is not taken into account. This is shown in Figure 1.
Third, the same relative followership metric is calculated for each of the followed 
accounts in each segment. To calculate the segment-level relative followership metric 
for each of the followed accounts, the numerator is the expected number of followers 
within that segment and the denominator is the actual number of followers within that 
segment. Note that the expected number of followers for an account in each segment 
can be a very small fraction, such as 0.001 followers. This is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 1. Cohort-level relative followership metric.
10 The International Journal of Press/Politics 00(0)
Fourth, a scaling factor is then calculated for each followed account within each 
segment by dividing the segment-level relative followership metric by the cohort-level 
relative followership metric. This scaling factor gives us a better understanding of the 
popularity of accounts within each segment given their popularity within the cohort 
overall. Finally, for each segment, we take the accounts with the largest scaling fac-
tors. One limitation of the method is that accounts with very few followers can have 
incredibly high scaling factors, depending on how those followers are distributed. To 
ensure that the method returns accounts which are typical of the segment, we set a 
minimum threshold: Only accounts which are followed by at least 10 percent of users 
in each segment can be considered characteristic for that segment.4 For our analyses, 
we take the 10 accounts with the highest scaling factors which are above the 10 per-
cent limit (Figure 3).
Results
Audience Engagement with RT
We examine how users in our 10,391 sample engage with RT. Our findings indicate 
that engagement with RT is low: There are only 2,806 engagements with RT, which 
we count as a retweet (2,371 instances) or a reply/mention (913 instances); this 
accounts for just 0.15 percent of the 1.87 million tweets sent by our sample. The dis-
tribution of the number of engagements with RT per user is long-tailed which means 
that a small number of users drive most of the engagement, as shown in Figure 4. This 
Figure 2. Segment-level relative followership metric.
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is typical of online behavior in general. The most engaged user accounted for 284 (10 
percent) of all the 2,806 engagements with RT and the 10 most engaged users 
accounted for 1,133 (40.4 percent) of all the engagements. Only 325 users of the 
10,391 users engaged with RT at least once (3.23 percent). However, it should be 
noted that during the year we study, only 3,395 of the 10,391 users in our sample send 
any tweets at all (33 percent). Of these users, 9.87 percent engage with RT, which is 
a larger but still small proportion. Figure 4(b) shows that while engagements with RT 
Figure 3. Scaling factor for each account in each segment.
Figure 4. (a) Distribution of engagements with RT_COM per user and (b) distribution of 
the percentage of user’s tweets which are engagements with RT_COM.
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are a small percentage of most user’s tweets, for two users it accounts for 100 percent 
of their activity. Both are low-volume users who send very few tweets.
The Demographics of RT’s Twitter Audience
To better understand the makeup of RT’s audience, we examine the demographics of 
the users in our sample. As Twitter’s API does not make such information available, 
we use two inference tools to uncover users’ demographics. The first tool is the 
“botometer,” which uses over 1,000 signals to calculate the probability that accounts 
are bots (Davis 2016). It has been widely used in many empirical studies of misinfor-
mation, although it has some well-established limitations, such as the fact that many 
bots are now increasingly sophisticated and mask obviously automated behavior. 
Previously reliable signals such as having a “stock photo” profile picture or tweeting 
at the same time each hour have now been addressed and many bots are more human-
like. A further problem is that many genuine Twitter users deploy automated or semi-
automated software to help manage their tweeting and followership patterns, which 
can make them appear bot-like. Notwithstanding these limitations, botometer is a scal-
able and accurate way of identifying bots and represents state-of-the-art for this task 
(Rauchfleisch and Kaiser 2020).
The second tool is the “M3” inference tool, which provides probabilistic demo-
graphic information about users (Wang et al. 2019). It estimates their age and gender, 
and whether or not they are an organization. This is a notoriously difficult classifica-
tion task (Hinds and Joinson 2018). The M3 tool is trained on 37 million profiles in 
total, of which 24 million were used to identify organizations, 15 million were used for 
gender inference, and 3 million for age. Performance varies across demographics, with 
an F1 score of 0.90 for Organizations, 0.92 for Gender, and only 0.52 for Age. This 
substantially outperforms other similar demographic inference tools, although we 
advise caution when interpreting the results for Age, which are notably weaker.
With any automated computational tool, there is a degree of error; the scale and 
speed afforded by such methods are counterbalanced by imperfect performance. 
However, they have been shown to work well when applied in aggregate to large data-
sets—even if some of the individual predictions they make are wrong. Although these 
errors are a reasonable constraint for social research, they nonetheless raise the risk of 
unfair outcomes and even social injustice when tools are used without consideration of 
their biases. Biased tools may perform unequally across different social groups; for 
instance, many content classifiers have different error rates for people from different 
ethnicities, which undermine their scientific validity and trustworthiness, and can have 
negative social effects (Davidson et al. 2019). These problems are often reflected in 
tools’ design; the M3 inference tool only makes binary gender classifications, poten-
tially misgendering individuals who do not identify as male or female, and it is likely 
to misidentify non-cis-gendered Twitter users. However, to the best of our knowledge, 
M3 and the botometer have not been found to contain large biases and are appropriate 
for empirical use, so long as they are used to assess online users (as is the case here) 
rather than to target or make decisions about them.
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Our results show several important differences between followers of RT and Twitter 
users more generally. First, the botometer classifies 39 percent of RT’s followers as 
bots. This is far larger than the 1.5 percent it classifies for our random sample, as well 
as Varol et al.’s (2017) estimate that between 9 and 15 percent of active Twitter 
accounts are bots. Second, followers of RT have different demographics to typical 
Twitter users (Table 1). They are far more likely to be male (.75 average probability 
compared with .62) and are likely to be slightly older (their probability of being 30–40 
is .2 compared with .15 for the random sample, and their probability of being over 40 
is .27 compared with .22). These values are all statistically significant measured using 
two nonparametric tests: (1) a permutation t-test and (2) a Wilcoxon test. To avoid 
Type I errors (a “false positive”), we apply a Holm’s correction for the multiple pair-
wise comparisons and in all cases results are still significant. The samples can be 
considered independent for the purposes of statistical testing (McDonald 2014). 
Results are shown in Table 2. We advise caution when interpreting the differences in 
age given the lower performance of the M3 inference tool on this demographic, as 
discussed above.
The Interests of RT’s Twitter Audience
To better understand the interests of RT’s Twitter followers, we examine the ten most 
followed accounts in our sample, as shown in Table 3. Users identified as bots were 
removed.5 The ten most followed include six news sources (NY Times, BBC Breaking 
News, BBC World, CNN Breaking, CNN, and Reuters), two social media platforms 
(YouTube and Twitter), and two American presidents (Barack Obama and Donald 
Trump). These are all mainstream Twitter accounts, which have a large number of fol-
lowers. The fact that these are the most followed accounts suggests, initially, that RT’s 
followers are quite typical of broader Twitter populations. However, the ten most fol-
lowed accounts offer only a very broad view of the interests of RT’s Twitter audience.
Table 1. Demographics and Activity of Users in Our Sample and a Control Group.
Variable
RT 
Sample
Control 
Group Difference
Significance 
(Permutation  
t-test) with  
Holm’s Correction
Significance 
(Wilcoxon) 
with Holm’s 
Correction
Bot 0.6 0.21 0.39 p < .001 p < .001
Age (18 and below) 0.23 0.30 −0.07 p < .05 p < .001
Age (19–29) 0.3 0.33 −0.03 p < .05 p < .001
Age (30–39) 0.2 0.15 0.05 p < .05 p < .001
Age (40 and above) 0.27 0.22 0.05 p < .05 p < .001
Gender (male) 0.75 0.62 0.13 p < .05 p < .001
Gender (female) 0.25 0.38 −0.13 p < .05 p < .001
Note. RT = Russia Today.
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Table 3. The Thirty-Five Main Segments of RT’s Twitter Audience.
Segment
Number 
of Users Label Segment
Number 
of Users Label
1 2,042 Indian (film) celebrities 19 88 Spam (sales 
accounts)
2 1,745 Anglophone 
international news
20 84 U.S. rappers/music
3 984 Argentinian/Hispanic 
celebrities
21 76 Korean pop music
4 760 Arabic religious/
political actors
22 68 Computer game 
players
5 551 Brazilian/Lusophone 
media and left-wing 
political actors
23 67 Malay celebrities
6 548 U.K. and U.S. left-wing 
activists
24 61 Spanish satirical 
news/pro-Catalan 
politics
7 396 Politcized U.K. 
celebrities
25 59 Serbian/Croatian 
politics/news
8 367 Russian news/politics 26 57 Dutch news/left 
politics
9 366 U.S. right-wing and alt-
right politics
27 56 Italian news/
left politics and 
celebrities
10 266 Nigerian news/politics 28 55 Australian news/
right and left 
politics
11 217 Indonesian political and 
business news
29 52 Greek news/right 
and left politics
12 179 French political and 
comic actors and 
news
30 50 Nepalese celebrities/
politics
13 161 Turkish media and 
comic actors and 
news
31 49 Dance music
14 149 South African news, 
media, political and 
religious actors
32 48 Thai media, 
entertainment, and 
political celebrities
15 113 Travel news 33 44 Filipino celebrities
16 107 Pornography 34 42 German news/
Green politics
17 98 African social media 
and celebrity actors
35 37 Japanese news/
politics
18 96 Cryptocurrency and 
blockchain news/
actors
 
Note. RT = Russia Today.
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We applied the Louvain algorithm to identify different segments of users within our 
sample. The Louvain identified sixty-nine segments, of which the largest thirty-five 
account for 97.5 percent of all 10,391 users. We focus on these thirty-five segments for 
the remainder of the analysis. As the Louvain algorithm is a stochastic process, it can 
return different results on each run. This raises the question of whether the sets of users 
discovered by the algorithm are consistent (i.e., they remain the same each time). To 
check the stability of the segments, we ran the algorithm on the data ten times, each 
time with a different random seed, and compared the sets of users with the Adjusted 
Rand Index6 (ARI; Steinley 2004). The mean average ARI between collections on dif-
ferent applications of the algorithm came out as 81.4 percent. Following Steinley 
(2004), this value (greater than 80 percent) suggests good agreement between the out-
puts of the algorithm, which suggests it has reliably partitioned the users into distinct 
segments. We included bots in this analysis as they play an important role in the struc-
ture of the network. The proportion of bots in each segment varies substantially from 
65 percent in one community (accounting for twenty-five out of thirty-nine users) 
down to 17 percent in another (accounting for ten out of sixty users). This potentially 
reflects findings from other research which suggests that some bots operate as coordi-
nated networks, working in concert to infiltrate and manipulate online discussions 
(Shao et al. 2018).
To characterize the thirty-five segments, we examined the accounts that they fol-
low. First, we examined the ten accounts most followed by users in each segment. 
Second, we implemented a surfacing methodology to identify the ten most character-
istic accounts followed by each segment, as described above in our “Method” section. 
We assigned a label to all of the most characteristic and most followed accounts; 
across the thirty-five segments, there were 567 accounts combined. Every account was 
labeled by two members of the research team using an open coding “ground-up” 
framework, which we iteratively revisited as the coding schema was developed 
(Strauss and Corbin 1990). From each segment, we took the labels for the ten most 
characteristic and ten most followed accounts and agreed a single label. These are 
shown in Table 3.
Analyzing the “most characteristic” accounts amplifies the interpretative signals, 
which are otherwise only latent in the list of “most followed” accounts. In nearly all 
cases, the most characteristic accounts hone in on interests that were hidden in the lists 
of most followed accounts, thereby allowing us to differentiate segments in a more 
nuanced way. This is important for cutting through the noise; the most followed 
accounts are often (1) the same or similar across all of the segments, (2) similar to the 
most followed accounts in the cohort overall (both with bots removed and included), 
and (3) similar to the most followed accounts on Twitter in general, such as Barack 
Obama, YouTube, The BBC, and Donald Trump. For instance, in Segment 6, the most 
followed accounts include some left-wing/activist actors (such as WikiLeaks, Edward 
Snowden, and Bernie Sanders, and also the BBC, New York Times, and Barack 
Obama), and the list of most characteristic accounts in Segment 6 is primarily com-
prised of left-wing organizations. Similarly, for Segment 10, there are two Nigerian 
accounts in the most followed list (@MobilePunch and @DONJAZZY); in the most 
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characteristic list, all of the accounts have a connection with Nigeria. Using both sig-
nals lets us identify the most salient distinctions between the segments.
Most of the thirty-five segments are distinguished by language and/or nationality, 
with many different nationalities represented. Within these linguistically distinct 
segments, the majority of them pivot around “soft news,” featuring a mix of celeb-
rity actors (such as film stars, social media influencers, sports personalities, comedi-
ans, and entertainers) and political actors (including both representatives and media 
pundits, covering right, left, green, and feminist positions). The predominance of 
soft news segments reflects RT’s efficacy in using entertainment stories to gain 
social media audiences (Orttung and Nelson 2019). Some segments also reflect 
“hard news,” primarily defined in relation to international news, business, and polit-
ical representatives.
Discussion
This is the first study that takes a wide view on RT’s Twitter followers, providing 
insight into who they are, how active they are, and what their interests are. We chal-
lenge the idea that RT’s audience mirrors the characteristics of the broadcaster itself, 
showing that it is highly heterogeneous. Our analysis of RT’s Twitter audience puts 
into question several long-standing views, and assumptions, about the types of people 
who engage with RT—and, by extension, the nature of RT and its role in the interna-
tional news ecosystem. Noticeably, we find that most of RT’s Twitter audience engages 
with it only very rarely. This suggests that great caution should be taken with overly 
“amplified” interpretations of RT’s audience, which examine only a small hardcore of 
active supporters. This is because (1) they are unlikely to be representative of all of 
RT’s online audience and (2) the broader audience displays internal diversity, with a 
mix of perspectives identified. Our analysis suggests that simplistic assessments of the 
people who are exposed to and consume RT’s content (and of the putative effects of 
RT on them) are likely, by their very nature, to be wrong. Exposure does not mean 
either engagement or endorsement.
Significantly, we found that RT’s Twitter audience is far more likely to be bots, with 
the estimated number of bots in our sample two to three times higher than among 
active Twitter accounts in general. This suggests that many of the accounts are either 
automated or semi-automated, or exhibit unusual tweeting patterns (Varol et al. 2017). 
Noticeably, the users in our sample of 10,391 RT Twitter followers were far more 
likely to be male and slightly older than the random sample of Twitter users. Although 
the difference is reasonably small for both characteristics, it is statistically significant 
and supports previous characterizations of RT’s audiences in the literature (Orttung 
and Nelson 2019).
From the most followed accounts across the whole cohort, we find that they follow 
a large number of news sources (accounting for six of the ten most followed). This 
suggests that users engage with RT as one way of consuming news and information in 
the context of many other sources of such content, rather than as a single way of 
accessing content. This resonates with a key finding of qualitative analyses, which 
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indicate that many consumers use RT as one news reference point among others to get 
an alternative perspective on events (Crilley et al. 2019). RT’s Twitter account may be 
used by audiences as an alternative to “Western” mainstream media in some cases and 
to receive a Russian perspective in others. Following RT on Twitter is not necessarily 
indicative of an extremist, fringe or anti-Western perspective.
Using network science techniques, we identified sixty-nine audience segments, of 
which we focused on and labeled 35. We find considerable variation in terms of the 
interests of the different segments, and demonstrate that they vary in terms of their 
country/cultural background, political views, and general interests. Some segments 
are defined primarily by nationality (e.g., Argentine pop culture, Indonesian pop cul-
ture, and Malay pop culture), others by different range of interests within the English 
language (e.g., Computer game playing, cryptocurrency, and pornography), and some 
where interests and nationality overlap, for example, Spanish news/politics, Italian 
news/politics (left-leaning), and Nigerian politics. Surprisingly, and further strength-
ening our argument that the bulk of RT’s Twitter audiences are not for the most part 
inherently extremist, we find little evidence of large segments of radical left or ultra 
right-wing groups. However, it should be noted that some, albeit small, amounts of 
conspiratorial content in the tweets of QAnon and Make America Great Again 
(MAGA) accounts in the U.S. right-wing segment are apparent. Many of the smaller 
segments are also overlaid with either left-wing or right-wing political orientations—
not so much extremist, as groups marginal to broad centrist politics. However, these 
small disparate right-wing and left-wing groupings following RT also map onto other 
segmented interests, and the theme of “News” cuts across several of the segments, 
often serving as the defining interest of the national segments. This also supports our 
claim that RT’s audience engages with its content alongside other news providers as a 
point of reference rather than as a singular main source of news.
Our research design focuses on the large number of users who are exposed to RT’s 
content, rather than focusing solely on the active users who engage with it. This has 
enabled us to provide new insights and to show the need to reconfigure understandings 
of RT, putting into question many widely held assumptions. However, it also raises its 
own limitations, namely, the weak tie that “followership” constitutes and what the true 
depth of connection that followers of RT have with the broadcaster. This is an impor-
tant limitation, and we caution that our results are intentionally situated at a very broad 
optic and that future work is needed to contrast them systematically with other assess-
ments of RT. We also focus primarily on Twitter, and the users there are unlikely to be 
representative of users online “in general” or of other platforms.
Conclusion
RT’s global Twitter audiences are best characterized as being diverse and frag-
mented, rather than as politically extreme. Broad brush stroke characterizations 
based on unfounded assertions are not useful to developing a more accurate under-
standing of RT and its impact. For example, the idea that RT’s audience “believe that 
human rights are a sham and democracy a fix” (Cohen 2014) and that they are a 
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“disillusioned western audience” (Turner 2016) are only applicable to a very small 
but vocal minority. It is unhelpful to make generalizations based on vocal minorities; 
they impede progress toward a better understanding of how RT is positioning itself 
as a new player in the shifting landscape of international news, disrupting the hege-
mony and prestige of legacy broadcasters, and providing alternative worldviews that 
have appeal with audiences. This data-driven study has offered new insights on who 
follows RT, how much they engage with it, and what their interests are. Future work 
should address the question of who consumes and engages with RT’s content further, 
investigating across multiple platforms and directly contrasting results with the 
audiences of mainstream media broadcasters.
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Notes
1. The full terms and conditions are available at https://twitter.com/en/tos.
2. See https://python-louvain.readthedocs.io/.
3. See https://www.brandwatch.com/blog/amazing-social-media-statistics-and-facts/.
4. The 10 percent threshold was selected by evaluating the results for different thresholds. 
Our testing indicates that a range of between 5 and 20 percent gives useful results; a lower 
value means that the surfaced accounts tend to be more niche and less well known, while 
a higher value means that the surfaced accounts tend to be more well known but also less 
easily differentiated, approximating the most followed accounts when the threshold is high 
enough.
5. Analysis was rerun with bots included, and very similar results were reported.
6. Using the Adjusted Rand Index function of python’s scikit-learn 0.23.1 library.
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